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Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics,
Immersion, and the Constitutional Record*
Lawrence B. Solum**
This Article contributes to the development of an originalist
methodology by making the case for an approach that employs three
distinct methods, each of which serves as a basis for confirming or
questioning the results reached by the other two. This approach will be
called the Method of Triangulation. The three component techniques
are as follows:
1. The Method of Corpus Linguistics: The method of corpus
linguistics employs large-scale data sets (corpora) that provide
evidence of linguistic practice.
2. The Originalist Method of Immersion: The method of
immersion requires researchers to immerse themselves in the
linguistic and conceptual world of the authors and readers of the
constitutional provision being studied.
3. The Method of Studying the Constitutional Record: The
method of studying the record framing, ratification, and
implementation requires the researcher to examine the drafting
process, including sources upon which the drafters relied, debates
during the drafting and ratification process, and the early
history of implementation of the constitutional provision.
These three methods each provide different inputs into the process of
constitutional interpretation and construction. Because each method
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can be checked against the others, the combination of the three methods
results in what can be called “triangulation.”
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INTRODUCTION
Originalism aims to recover the original meaning of the
constitutional text and then put that meaning into practice. How can
this aim be achieved? A complete theory of originalist interpretation
requires the articulation of an interpretive methodology—a set of
1623
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guidelines and practices that maximize the likelihood of accurately
recovering the original meaning of the constitutional text: we can
call a set of such guidelines and practices originalist methodology.
Ideally, such a methodology would be objective and replicable and
hence would result in intersubjective agreement on original
meaning. If disagreements persist despite the application of the
methods, the reasons for disagreement should be transparent and
subject to assessment and debate by judges, advocates, and scholars.
This Article contributes to the development of an originalist
methodology by making the case for an approach that employs three
distinct methods, each of which serves as a basis for confirming or
questioning the results reached by the other two. This approach will
be called the Method of Triangulation. The three component
techniques are as follows:
•
•

•

The Method of Corpus Linguistics: The method of corpus
linguistics employs large-scale data sets (corpora) that
provide evidence of linguistic practice. 1
The Originalist Method of Immersion: The method of
immersion requires researchers to immerse themselves in the
linguistic and conceptual world of the authors and readers of
the constitutional provision being studied. 2
The Method of Studying the Constitutional Record: The
method of studying the record framing, ratification, and
implementation requires the researcher to examine
the drafting process, including sources upon which the
drafters relied, debates during the drafting and ratification
process, and the early history of implementation of the
constitutional provision. 3

1. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part V.
3. See infra Part VI. The record of framing, ratification, and implementation overlaps
with the “legislative history” of a constitutional provision. I do not use the phrase “legislative
history” for three reasons: first, that phrase is closely connected to an intentionalist approach
to interpretation; second, the method that I am describing includes materials that precede the
drafting process and hence come before the start of the normal definition of “legislative
history;” and, third, this method includes implementation history which starts after the
legislative history concludes.

1624

10.SOLUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1621

4/26/2018 4:12 PM

Triangulating Public Meaning

These three methods each provide different inputs into the process
of constitutional interpretation and construction. Because each
method can be checked against the others, the combination of the
three methods results in what can be called “triangulation.”
Ideally, triangulation would yield consilience—agreement
between each of the three methods. When consilience is obtained,
the Method of Triangulation provides strong evidence of original
meaning. This evidence is even stronger when the results produced
by the individual methods are replicated by independent researchers.
When the methods disagree or when one method produces different
results when employed by different researchers, further investigation
may be required or the conflict between methods and researchers
may be resolved by weighing the evidence or providing an
explanation that resolves an apparent disagreement.
This Article investigates the Method of Triangulation from the
perspective of public meaning originalism. Part I provides a brief
introduction to public meaning priginalism. Part II lays out an
account of public meaning as “communicative content” and explores
the role of both semantics and context in the production of the
original meaning of the constitutional text. Part III briefly surveys
some of the difficulties with reliance on contemporary linguistic
intuitions and dictionary definitions from the relevant period. Parts
IV, V, and VI provide an account of the three component tools for
investigating original meaning: corpus linguistics, immersion, and
the record of framing, ratification, and implementation. Part VII lays
out the Method of Triangulation. Part VIII connects the Method of
Triangulation to the central aim of interpretation—to provide a
translation of the constitutional text from the American English of
the relevant period into contemporary American English. Part IX
provides a brief discussion of various problems of implementation,
including the role of triangulation in the courts. The Conclusion
provides a brief summary.
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM
“Public meaning originalism” is a member of the originalist
family of constitutional theories. Almost all originalists agree on
two ideas: 4
•
•

The Fixation Thesis: The linguistic meaning or communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the
time each provision is framed and ratified. 5
The Constraint Principle: Constitutional practice, including
the decision of constitutional cases and the judicial articulation of constitutional doctrines, should be constrained by
the original meaning of the constitutional text. 6

The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed, and that fixed
meaning is binding on constitutional actors, including judges,
presidents and other executive officials, and members of legislative
bodies. The claim made by the Fixation Thesis is empirical or factual:
given the way language works, the communicative content of a
writing is fixed at the time of drafting. The claim made by the
Constraint Principle is normative: as a matter of political morality,
constitutional actors ought to be bound by the fixed original
meaning of the constitutional text.
Although originalists almost all agree on fixation and constraint,
they disagree on other matters. One disagreement concerns the
nature of original meaning. The range of views on this question
include the following:
•

Public Meaning Originalism: The original meaning of the
constitutional text is the meaning that the text had for “We
the People,” the citizens who constituted the United States.

4. For a collection of sources supporting the claim that originalists agree on fixation
and constraint, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 n.28 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The
Fixation Thesis].
5. See id.
6. Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (Mar. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available online at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215).
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•

Original Intentions Originalism: The original meaning of the
constitutional text is the meaning that the framers intended
to convey.
Ratifiers’ Understandings Originalism: The original meaning
of the constitutional text is the meaning conveyed to the
ratifiers of each provision.
Original Methods Originalism: The original meaning of the
constitutional text is the meaning produced by application of
the original methods of constitutional interpretation and
construction to the text.
Original Law Originalism: The law in effect at the time the
Constitution was ratified is legally binding unless it was
changed by methods authorized by the original law.

•
•

•

Although different versions of originalism may produce different
outcomes at the margins, it seems likely that they will converge when
applied to most of the constitutional text. Because the framers
intended to communicate to the public and the ratifiers were
members of the public, the first three forms of originalism are likely
to produce identical results except in cases where there was a failure
of constitutional communication. The versions of originalism that
focus on original methods and original law may diverge more
substantially, because these theories do not accept the idea that the
constitutional text was written to be accessible to “We the People.” 7
Because of the difference between and among originalists, we
can distinguish between two modes of originalist theory and
practice. The first mode is “sectarian”: sectarian originalism adopts a
particular version of originalism, for example, public meaning
originalism. The second mode is “ecumenical”: ecumenical
originalism aims to develop theories and engage in practice that is
neutral on the questions about which originalists disagree. This
Article is primarily an exercise in sectarian originalism, argued from

7. The relationship between public meaning originalism and original methods requires
extended discussion, but the divergence between these approaches should not be exaggerated.
Public meaning originalism recognizes that some provisions of the Constitution have technical
legal meanings; for this reason, the cases where original methods and original law provide the
most distinctive meanings can be incorporated via the notion of a publicly accessible meaning
and the division of linguistic labor.
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the perspective of public meaning originalism; the case for the claim
that public meaning originalism offers the best theory of originalism
is not made here but is the subject of work in progress. 8
Nonetheless, the Method of Triangulation will be relevant to the
recovery of the intentions of the framers, the understandings of the
ratifiers, or any other form of original meaning. Corpus linguistics,
immersion, and the record of framing, ratification, and
implementation—all of these constituent methods can be applied to
recovery of original meanings as conceived differently by different
versions of originalism.
Some originalists embrace the interpretation-construction distinction, 9 which can be stated as follows:
•
•

Interpretation: Constitutional interpretation is the activity
that discovers the communicative content of the constitutional text.
Construction: Constitutional construction is the activity that
determines the legal effect of the constitutional text,
including the decision of constitutional cases and the legal
content of constitutional doctrines.

Although the interpretation-construction distinction can and should
be embraced by all originalists, some originalists may prefer to use
the terms interpretation and construction synonymously, using other
vocabulary to describe these two distinct concepts.
Originalists differ on other questions, including the extent to
which the constitutional text is underdeterminate. Some originalists
believe that at least some provisions of the constitutional text create
substantial “construction zones,” because these provisions are vague
or open textured. 10 Other originalists believe that the text is almost
fully determinate; such determinacy might result from application
of the original methods of constitutional interpretation and

8. Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (Nov. 28, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis].
9. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010).
10. Other construction zones may be created if the text is irreducibly ambiguous or if
the text has gaps or contradictions.
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construction or it might result from the application of default rules,
for example, a rule that requires deference to democratic institutions
when the text is not clear. 11
II. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING AS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE
COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT
A complete originalist theory must offer a theory and
methodology of both interpretation and construction, but this
Article is concerned with the methods by which constitutional actors
and scholars can discover the original public meaning of the
constitutional text. In other words, the Method of Triangulation
provides guidance for originalist constitutional interpretation.
Originalists must also provide an originalist account of constitutional
construction, but that topic is outside the scope of this Article. 12
This Part provides a brief summary of the theory of meaning
adopted by public meaning originalism. The summary is brief and
incomplete because a full account would require a deep dive into
theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language. The aim here
is simply to lay out the assumptions upon which the
methodology rests—not to provide the arguments or authority for
those assumptions. 13
A. The Situation of Constitutional Communication
The basic premise of public meaning originalism is that the
authors of each constitutional provision intended to communicate
content to “We the People,” the body of citizens that constitute the
polity of the United States. In other words, the constitutional text
was intended to be accessible to the public.

11. Cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (arguing for the relative determinacy of the constitutional text and
against the claim that the meaning of many constitutional provisions is general and abstract).
12. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (discussing originalist approaches to constitutional
construction) [hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construction].
13. In due course, public meaning originalists must provide justifications for their
account of public meaning. My own version of such a justification will be provided in Solum,
The Public Meaning Thesis, supra note 8.
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To achieve this goal, the authors of the text were required to
write in a way that would enable public comprehension of the text.
Comprehension of the text by the public requires what we can call
“public accessibility”—the communicative content of the text must
be accessible by citizens, the group that constitutes the polity and
hence the relevant segment of the population. A text has
“unmediated public accessibility” if it can be read and understood by
members of the public with reasonable effort. If the text employs
technical language (terms of art), it may nonetheless be accessible.
The accessibility of clauses that employ the specialized vocabulary of
a linguistic subcommunity (such as lawyers) requires that two
conditions be satisfied: (1) the technical language must be
recognizable as such, and (2) the technical meaning must be
accessible using reasonable effort. If these two conditions
are satisfied, it results in what can be called “mediated
public accessibility.” 14
The goal of conveying the communicative content of the
constitutional text to “We the People” is achieved if all of the
constitutional text satisfies the conditions for mediated or
unmediated public accessibility. Notice that public accessibility does
not require that each and every member of the public read and
understand the constitutional text. When a particular constitutional
provision is proposed, debated, and ratified, it is likely only a fraction
of the public will actually read the text. Other members of the public
may read secondary accounts, and those accounts may quote and
explain the meaning of some of the provisions. Just as a highway is
publicly accessible, even if some members of the public never use it,
so too, the constitutional text is publicly accessible, even if some
members of the public never read and comprehend it.
To achieve the goal of communicating constitutional content to
the public via the text, the authors of each constitutional provision
necessarily had to use the tools at hand, the transmission of meaning
via a text in the context of constitutional communication.
Simplifying, we can say that the constitutional text conveys meaning
via two sets of tools: (1) semantic tools, including the conventional
14. Some citizens were not native speakers of English and some of those citizens may
not have been sufficiently proficient in English to read and comprehend the Constitution.
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semantic meanings of the words and phrases the regularities of
syntax, grammar, and punctuation that allow words and phrases to
be combined into meaningful units, and (2) contextual tools,
including the ability to disambiguate words and phrases with
multiple meanings and to enrich the semantic content of the text.
B. The Role of Conventional Semantic Meaning
Words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings,
determined by patterns of usage. Lexicographers report these
conventional semantic meanings in dictionary definitions, but such
definitions are secondary evidence of patterns of usage. 15 Given the
assumption that the constitutional text is intended to convey content
to the public, the authors of the text were required to employ
publicly accessible semantics if they were to achieve the goal of
conveying meaning to the public.
The most basic component of publicly accessible semantics is
what lawyers call “literal meaning”—the meaning that a text would
have if interpreted to have only that meaning yielded by the
conventional semantic meanings of the words and phrases as
combined by syntax, grammar, and punctuation. Literal meaning is
acontextual; it does not take the role of context in the production of
communicative content into account. One can imagine
communicative situations in which the context of communication is
very thin, and hence, the author of a text would be required to rely
almost entirely on semantics. For example, the author of a “message
in a bottle” would know that the reader of the message would have
very little information about the context in which the message was
written. If the message itself did not provide information about the
context of drafting, then the author would be required to rely almost
entirely on literal meanings.
Some words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings
that are widely or even almost universally shared within a linguistic
community. But there are also “terms of art,” words or phrases that
have meanings within a linguistic subcommunity. For example,

15. See generally BO SVENSÉN, A HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF DICTIONARY-MAKING (2009) (describing the methods of lexicography).
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Article I, Section VIII grants Congress power to “grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal,” 16 but it may well be that the phrase “Letters
of Marque and Reprisal” would have been familiar to maritime
lawyers, sea captains, and those involved in maritime commerce, but
not to members of the general public. Terms of art involve a division
of linguistic labor; usage by a linguistic subcommunity determines
the conventional semantic meanings of specialized or technical
vocabulary. 17 Public meaning originalism can account for terms of art
via the notion of publicly accessible meaning; 18 more precisely, terms
of art are publicly accessible via the mechanisms identified by the
notion of mediated public meaning. For example, a farmer in
Massachusetts who read the proposed Constitution of the United
States might realize that “Letters of Marque and Reprisal” was a
technical term and consult an expert (an admiralty lawyer or sea
captain) about its meaning.
C. The Role of Context
The full communicative content of the constitutional text is not
reducible to its literal meaning. This is because of the role that
context plays in clarifying and enriching the communicative content
conveyed by both oral and written communication. In the
philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the role of context
is described as “pragmatic” and “pragmatics” is contrasted to
“semantics.” 19 In the discussion that follows, I will use “context” and
“contextual” in order to avoid confusion of “linguistic pragmatics”
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
17. See Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 409, 429–31 (2009). The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually
attributed to Hilary Putnam. See Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in 7 LANGUAGE,
MIND AND KNOWLEDGE (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975), reprinted in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND
REALITY 215, 227 (1st ed. 1975); Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic Labor and Speaker
Competence, 34 PHIL. STUD. 37, 37 (1978).
18. In addition, there are words and phrases that are ambiguous with both public
meanings and technical meanings. For example, the phrase “declare war” may have both a
generally understood meaning that is relatively thin and thicker more technical meanings. I am
grateful to William Treanor for this point. The question as to how public meaning originalism
should handle cases of “public-meaning versus technical meaning ambiguity” is a difficult one
and is outside the scope of this Article.
19. See generally ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS (3d. ed. 2011).
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with “legal pragmatism,” which is an unrelated position in general
legal theory. 20
1. Contextual disambiguation
The first role that context plays in communication relates to
ambiguity. The word ambiguity is sometimes used to mean
something like “the absence of clarity,” but it also has a more precise
and technical meaning that contrasts ambiguity with vagueness and
open texture. In this technical sense, the word ambiguity refers to the
multiplicity of possible meanings. 21 Thus, the word cool has a sense
related to temperature (as in, “the room is cool”), another sense
related to personal style (as in, “Miles Davis was cool”), and a third
sense relating to temperament (as in, “he kept his cool”).
Acontextually, the word cool is ambiguous, but in each of the
supplied examples, cool is disambiguated by context and readers are
easily able to glean the relevant sense.
Many of the words and phrases that make up the constitutional
text would be ambiguous if they were read acontextually, but once
context is taken into account, the meaning becomes clear, as in the
following examples:
•
•

•

Acontextually, the word Senate in Article I might refer to the
Roman Senate, but in context, it clearly refers to the United
States Senate as one of the two houses of Congress.
Acontextually, the word State as used in many constitutional
provisions might refer to the condition of some thing or
person, but in context it clearly refers to the constituent
political units of the United States, for example,
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia.
Acontextually, the word arms as used in the Second
Amendment might refer to human appendages, but in
context it clearly refers to weapons that can be carried.

20. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
21. Sometimes the word polysemy is used to refer to what I call “ambiguity.” On the
relationship of ambiguity, polysemy, and vagueness, see David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and
Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 273 (1993).
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These examples are all obvious, and may seem trivial, but their very
obviousness demonstrates the power of contextual disambiguation.
2. Contextual (pragmatic) enrichment
Pragmatic or contextual enrichment is the mechanism by which
authors can convey content to readers without making that content
explicit. The mechanisms of contextual enrichment are intuitively
accessible to competent language users. Consider four forms of
contextual enrichment.
a. Implicature. The word implicature was coined by Paul Grice
to refer to the ability of speakers to convey content without explicit
statement. 22 For example, a law professor might write a letter for a
student applying for a judicial clerkship that said only the following:
I recommend Alice to you. She attended class regularly and was
always on time.

This letter makes no explicit negative statements about Alice; the
literal meaning is entirely positive. But in the context of a letter of
recommendation, these statements are quite negative because they
imply that the best that can be said for Alice does not include the
attributes required of an excellent judicial clerk, including brilliance,
analytic ability, diligence, and so forth. If the best that can be said
about Alice is that she was on time and did not miss class, the
implicature is that the recommender does not believe that she would
be a good choice for the position of law clerk.
It is not clear that the United States Constitution contains any
implicatures of the kind just identified. Sometimes the word
implicature is used in a broad sense that would include phenomenon
that are discussed below as impliciture or presupposition and the
Constitution does include implicatures in this broad sense of
the word.
b. Impliciture. The word impliciture was coined by Kent Bach to
refer to a form of contextual enrichment that is distinct from
“implicature.” 23 The word ellipses is sometimes used to refer to the

22. See Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/implicature/ (last updated June 24, 2014).
23. Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124 (1994).
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same phenomenon. The following examples are given by Bach, with
the impliciture made explicit in the bracketed text:
•
•
•

Jack and Jill are married [to each other].
Bill insulted his boss and [as a result] got fired.
Nina has had enough [pasta to eat]. 24

Thus, if someone says, “Bill insulted his boss and got fired,” the
implicit [as a result] is unstated but nonetheless communicated to
the audience. The audience infers that the speaker intended to
connect the two events causally.
One example of constitutional impliciture is contained in Article
I, Section 9, which states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed,” 25 with [by Congress] as an impliciture. Read
acontextually, the Ex Post Facto Clause might prohibit the passage
of such laws by state or foreign governments, but the surrounding
context of Section 9 makes it clear that the prohibition applies only
to Congress. Section 10 uses the phrase “[n]o state shall” 26 to
articulate restrictions on the several states. Section 9 omits explicit
identification of the entity to which several of its restrictions apply,
but its placement in Article I, which concerns Congress, 27 and the
juxtaposition with Section 10, operate to create the impliciture that
several of the Section 10 restrictions apply only to Congress.
c. Presupposition. Another form of contextual enrichment is called
“presupposition.” Presupposition operates to convey communicative
content that is not explicitly stated but that is presupposed by what is
said in a particular context. 28 Consider the following examples:
•

Utterance: “Cass is no longer the head of OIRA.”
Presupposition: “Cass was once the head of OIRA.”

24. Kent Bach, Impliciture vs. Explicature: What’s the Difference? (unpublished
manuscript) (available online at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/Bach.ImplExpl.pdf).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
26. Id. art. I, § 10.
27. See id. art. I, § 1.
28. See, e.g., Philippe Schlenker, Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition
Projection, 34 THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 157 (2008); Bas C. van Fraassen, Presupposition,
Implication, and Self-Reference, 65 J. PHIL. 136 (1968); David I. Beaver & Bart Geurts,
Presupposition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (April 1, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/presupposition/.
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Utterance: “Adrian should not eat meat.” Presupposition:
“Adrian does eat meat.”
Utterance: “Lisa’s wife is pregnant.” Presupposition: “Lisa
has a wife.”

In each of the examples, the presupposed content is communicated
by the utterance—even though it is not stated explicitly.
Presuppositions take various forms. We might distinguish
between “conversational presuppositions” (also called “speaker
presuppositions” or “pragmatic presuppositions”) and “conventional
presuppositions” (or “semantic presuppositions”). Conventional
presuppositions are triggered by particular words or phrases; in the
first example above, the phrase “no longer” triggers the
presupposition that Cass was once the head of OIRA. For our
purposes, we can put these technicalities to the side.
The constitutional text may have a variety of presuppositions.
The most famous example is the Ninth Amendment, which reads:
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 29
The text does not explicitly state that there are rights that are
retained by the people, but because it would make no sense to
prohibit constructions that deny or disparage nonexistent rights, the
existence of retained rights is a presupposition communicated by the
Ninth Amendment.
d. Modulation. Finally, consider what is sometimes called
modulation. The intuitive idea is that, in context, a conventional
semantic meaning can be adjusted or modulated to fit the context—
essentially a new meaning is created (sometimes on the spot) so that
an old word is used in a new way. As Francois Recanati observes,
Sense modulation is essential to speech, because we use a (more or
less) fixed stock of lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of
things, situations and experiences. Through the interaction
between the context-independent meanings of our words and the
particulars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated
senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand. 30

29.
30.
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In ordinary speech, modulations may be “one-offs,” used on a single
occasion. But in the law, modulation can create a new technical
meaning for a word that also has an ordinary sense.
The Constitution contains a variety of modulations—special
purpose constitutional meanings that can be understood by paying
attention to context. One example is (or hypothetically may be) the
Recess Appointments Clause, which uses the word recess. 31 Read
acontextually, a recess might be any break in the business of the
Senate—even a lunch break. But in context, recess is best read as a
modulation, the meaning of which plays off the complementary term
session. The relevant sense of recess is a modulation of the
conventional semantic meaning; it is limited to the break between
sessions of the Senate.
Finally, there is a residual category of “free enrichments” that do
not fit into any of these categories. For present purposes, the
category of free enrichment is set aside. 32
D. Distinguishing Expected Applications from Original Meaning
Original public meaning should be distinguished from what have
been called “original expected application[s].” 33 The meaning of a
text is one thing; expectations about how the text will or should be
applied to particular cases or issues is another. Thus, the framers and
ratifiers of the Second Amendment may have expected that the
“right to . . . bear Arms” would be applied to muskets and flintlocks,
but the meaning of arms is more general and would encompass
modern weapons. 34 Public meaning originalism affirms the
Constraint Principle with respect to the public meaning of the
constitutional text and not the application expectations of the
framers, ratifiers, or public at the time a constitutional provision
went into effect.
Although original expected applications do not constitute the
original meaning of the constitutional text, they are nonetheless

31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
32. NICHOLAS ALLOTT, KEY TERMS IN PRAGMATICS 80 (2010).
33. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–
26 (2007).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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relevant to constitutional interpretation because they can provide
evidence of the original public meaning. Thus, if the framers believed
that muskets and flintlocks were “arms” within the meaning of the
Second Amendment, that fact is evidence that favors any theory of
the meaning of arms that encompasses muskets and flintlocks and is
evidence that disfavors any interpretation that would exclude them.
Application expectations may frequently be important or even
decisive evidence favoring or disfavoring a hypothesis regarding
original meaning. For example, the hypothesis that arms in the
Second Amendment refers to limbs attached to the upper body of
humans would be inconsistent with evidence that the framers of that
provision expected it to apply to muskets and flintlock pistols—
which are clearly not limbs.
In addition, there are cases where application expectations are
incorrect and hence where evidence of the expectations does not
provide good evidence of meaning. The clearest example of this kind
of case would be the situation where the expectation was based on a
false belief about the facts. To take a very simple example, if the
members of the Philadelphia Convention had a false belief about the
age of a potential presidential candidate, such that the individual
would not have been eligible for election to the presidency in 1782
(because the individual was actually thirty-two and not thirty-six),
the expectation that the Article II requirement that the President be
thirty-five years of age would be satisfied does not provide evidence
that the phrase “the age of thirty five years” had some weird
meaning such that thirty-five years actually meant “thirty
two years.” 35 The factual error fully explains the erroneous
application belief.
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH LINGUISTIC INTUITIONS
AND DICTIONARIES
Contemporary readers of the Constitution have pre-reflective
beliefs about the meanings of the words and phrases that make up
the text; these beliefs are called “linguistic intuitions.” Similarly, the
words in the constitutional text are defined in dictionaries, both

35.
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contemporary dictionaries and dictionaries from the historical
periods in which the various provisions of the text were authored.
We can imagine a naïve approach to originalist research that relied
on contemporary linguistic intuitions and various dictionaries as the
primary method for discovering the conventional semantic meanings
of the words and phrases that make up the constitutional text. 36
But an intuition-and-dictionary–based methodology for discovering the meaning of the constitutional text is problematic for a
variety of reasons. Before we turn to the constituent elements of the
Method of Triangulation, we can identify some of the problems with
the intuition-and-dictionary approach.
Contemporary linguistic intuitions work well in determining the
conventional semantic meanings of words and phrases in a text when
the individual who is doing the interpreting has intuitions that are
based on patterns of usage observed during a period that coincides
with the writing of the text. Thus, the linguistic intuitions of an
adult native speaker of American English in 2017 are likely to be an
accurate guide to a text written in 2017 and several years before or
after that date. But in the case of the constitutional text, many
provisions are quite old. The most recent provisions to be drafted are
the Twenty-Third through the Twenty-Sixth Amendments—which
were proposed between 1960 and 1971. These four amendments
were drafted at a time when many, but not all, contemporary
interpreters were alive. The Twenty-Second Amendment was
proposed in 1947—when the oldest serving Justice (as of this
writing), Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was about fourteen years old. All the
remaining provisions of the Constitution were drafted before any
currently serving Justice was born. Of course, many lawyers, judges,
and legal scholars were born after 1971. Justice Gorsuch was only
four years of age when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was proposed.
Because of the phenomenon of linguistic drift (or semantic shift),
contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the
conventional semantic meanings of older provisions of the
constitutional text. Consider the following examples of words or

36. The use of contemporary meaning is not necessarily naïve. Judges might
deliberately substitute contemporary meanings for original meanings in order to amend the
Constitution through linguistic subterfuge.
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phrases in the constitutional text where contemporary linguistic
intuitions would be a poor guide to the original meaning:
•

•

•

•

Domestic violence in Article IV: The contemporary meaning
of the phrase is something like “violence within the family,
including spousal abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse,” but
the original meaning was likely “violence within a state,
including riots, insurrections, and rebellions.” 37
Dollar in the Seventh Amendment: The contemporary
meaning of the word is the Federal Reserve Note issued by
the United States Treasury, but the original meaning was
likely the Spanish silver dollar, understood as a unit of hard
currency defined by silver content. 38
Science in Article I: The contemporary meaning of the word
is usually limited to the so-called hard sciences such as
physics, chemistry, and biology, but the original meaning was
systematic knowledge and would have included the
humanities, including history, philosophy, and theology. 39
The number characteristic of verbs following the phrase
United States in many clauses: The contemporary
punctuation practice suggests that the use of the plural form

37. See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 4, at 16 (“The contemporary semantic
meaning of ‘domestic violence’ is ‘‘’intimate partner abuse,’ ‘battering,’ or ‘wife-beating,’’’ and
it is understood to be ‘physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse that takes place in
the context of an intimate relationship, including marriage.’”).
38. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 281–82
(2017) (“[A]n otherwise-excellent student note on the Seventh Amendment’s ‘Twenty Dollars
Clause’ makes the mistaken assumption that the word ‘dollar’ refers to the contemporary
Federal Reserve note, when in fact the word ‘dollar’ almost certainly referred to the Spanish
silver dollar weighing 416 grains and possibly other dollars with closely approximate silver
content.” (citations omitted)).
39. See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 51 (2002) (“The tendency of modern usage is to associate
the term ‘science’ with the natural sciences, such as chemistry, physics, and biology. These are
understood as the ‘hard sciences’ and as the exemplary or paradigm cases of science. Even a
systematic and formal body of knowledge, such as geometry, mathematics, or symbolic logic,
might be thought to be science in only a loose or derivative sense. To the extent this is a
feature of modern usage, however, it does not conform to the understanding of the term
‘science’ in the founding era. Rather, there is general agreement that science was usually
understood in a broader sense, so as to include knowledge, especially systematic or grounded
knowledge of enduring value. Thus, the meanings of ‘learning’ and ‘science’ would be closely
related.” (footnotes omitted)).
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of verbs means that the United States refers to a collection of
states rather than one nation, but the eighteenth-century
grammar frequently used plural forms after singular nouns
ending in the letter s. 40 In this example, it is grammar rather
than semantics that has changed. 41
Because semantics, syntax, and punctuation change over time,
contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a reliable guide to the
meaning of older texts.
This problem also exists for constitutional phrases of art. For
example, the phrase “freedom of the press” has a contemporary
meaning for lawyers that is shaped by the decisional law of the U.S.
Supreme Court, but there is at least a strong possibility that the
original meaning was a much narrower technical meaning that
restricted the freedom of the press to a rule against the licensing of
printing presses and prior restraints. 42
There is another obvious problem with linguistic intuitions.
Scholars and judges may form the intention to be objective and
neutral when they consult their linguistic intuitions about the
meaning of constitutional words and phrases, but they may have
strong beliefs about what the constitutional language “ought to
mean.” The influence of these beliefs on their intuitions may not be
fully transparent to the interpreters themselves; in other words, they
may not recognize the role of their own biases and preconceptions.
Those who engage in the interpretation of legal texts may engage in

40. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 489 (2007) (“Justice
Thomas, Professor Amar, and others have assigned critical interpretive weight to the fact that,
‘[i]n the Constitution, after all, “the United States” is consistently a plural noun.’ This
grammar would appear to suggest that the Constitution reflects the view that the United States
is a collection of states rather than one nation. What this reading misses, however, is the fact
that in the late eighteenth century, nouns ending in the letter s were commonly assigned plural
verbs, regardless of whether or not the noun itself was plural.” (footnote omitted)).
41. I am grateful to William Treanor for this example.
42. Discussion of the relevant history is far beyond the scope of this article. See
generally David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 160 (2001) (“Until the last
decade of the seventeenth century, both Parliament and English kings relied upon licensing to
control the press.”).
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“motivated reasoning.” 43 Lawyers are required to make the best
reasonable case for the interpretation that favors their client, and
they are subject to the same problems of bias and preconception that
affect judges and scholars.
Some of the problems with dictionaries are different from and
some are related to the problems with linguistic intuitions.
Dictionaries are not written to influence the outcome of
constitutional disputes and hence are unlikely to suffer from the
motivated reasoning problem. Contemporary dictionaries are
primarily intended to report current usage—although the Oxford
English Dictionary provides extensive examples of usage with dates,
which sometimes can be used to reconstruct the meanings that
existed at the time a particular constitutional provision was drafted.
What about period dictionaries? There are two dictionaries that
are used with some frequency in reconstructing the meaning of the
early provisions of the Constitution—the unamended text and the
first twelve amendments. The first of these is A Dictionary of the
English Language, which was authored by Samuel Johnson. Johnson
did the work on his dictionary by himself over a nine-year period; his
dictionary was published in 1755. 44 Johnson’s dictionary reports
English usage in Great Britain from a period that ended thirty-two
years before the drafting of the United States Constitution in 1787.
The second dictionary is Noah Webster’s 1828 American
Dictionary of the English Language. Webster borrowed from
Johnson; he completed his dictionary over an eighteen-year period. 45
Although Webster’s dictionary reports American English, it was
published thirty-eight years after the Philadelphia Convention.
The ideal dictionary would report American usage in the late
eighteenth century, but neither Samuel Johnson’s nor Noah
Webster’s hits this precise target. Nonetheless, both dictionaries
provide some relevant evidence of conventional semantic meanings

43. On the general idea of motivated reasoning, see Milton Lodge & Charles Taber,
Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON:
COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY (Arthur Lupia, Mathew D.
McCubbins, & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 2000).
44. See W. JACKSON BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON 240–60 (1975).
45. See JOSHUA KENDALL, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER: NOAH WEBSTER’S
OBSESSION AND THE CREATION OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE (2010).
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of the early provisions of the constitutional text. Neither dictionary is
perfect. Either dictionary could misreport the conventional semantic
meanings of its era. Either dictionary could omit a meaning that was
the relevant public meaning of a constitutional provision once
context is taken into account. Neither dictionary provides primary
evidence of the patterns of usage that constitute conventional
semantic meaning.
Both contemporary linguistic intuitions and dictionaries have a
role to play in originalist research, but there are good reasons to
search for better methods. In the three Parts that follow, this Article
investigates corpus linguistics, immersion, and the record of framing,
ratification, and implementation as constituent elements of the
Method of Triangulation. Once that investigation is complete, we
will turn to the Method of Triangulation itself.
IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS
The core of the method of corpus linguistics is the use of data
sets (corpora) and search engines to identify primary evidence of the
patterns of usage. After describing corpus methods, this Part will
discuss corpus lexicography, the use of corpus linguistics
in identifying historical patterns of usage that constitute
conventional semantic meanings. A second use of corpus linguistics
involves the identification of collocates (neighboring words); this
technique provides a tool that can aid the process of contextual
disambiguation. Finally, the relationship between corpus linguistics
and contextual enrichment will be briefly discussed.
A. A Brief Description
Corpus linguistics is the name for an approach to investigating
linguistic phenomena. The approach involves large datasets, called
“corpora,” that can be searched using a variety of techniques
including key word in context (KWIC) searches and searches that
identify “collocates” (words used in proximity with the search term).
Most dictionaries are compiled using very selective and limited
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datasets, 46 but corpus lexicography allows the investigation of word
meaning using large datasets that can represent a wide variety
of sources.
Recently, corpus lexicography has begun to play a role in the
interpretation of legal texts. Following Stephen Mouritsen’s
important article, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 47 the
pioneering judicial opinion was a concurrence by Associate Chief
Justice Lee of the Utah Supreme Court. 48 Corpus lexicography was
utilized by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Harris. 49
There is a growing body of legal scholarship exploring and using
corpus techniques, 50 including an important forthcoming article coauthored by Justice Lee and Stephen Mouritsen. 51 The use of corpus
linguistics in originalist research is currently limited with respect to
the unamended Constitution and the first twelve amendments. The
Corpus of the Founding Era American English (COFEA) is not yet
available, and the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA)
begins with 1810. When COFEA becomes available, there will be

46. For a description of data collection and data selection in contemporary
lexicography, see SVENSÉN, supra note 15, at 39–75. For a discussion of a corpusbased approach to lexicography, see VINCENT B. Y. OOI, COMPUTER CORPUS LEXICOGRAPHY (1998).
47. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915.
48. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 40, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Lee, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also Recent Case, State v. Rasabout, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1468 (2016).
49. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016) (“Keeping in mind that
we must interpret the word ‘information’ as used in the DLEOA ‘according to the common
and approved usage of the language,’ we apply a tool that can aid in the discovery of ‘how
particular words or phrases are actually used in written or spoken English.’ The Corpus of
Contemporary American English (COCA) allows users to ‘analyze[] ordinary meaning
through a method that is quantifiable and verifiable.’” (footnotes omitted)).
50. See, e.g., D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the
Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517; Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule
of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2016); James C
Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning:
A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016); Lawrence M.
Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 57 (2016);
Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus
Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017).
51. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
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corpora with coverage corresponding to the relevant historical period
for all the provisions of the United States Constitution. 52
B. Corpus Lexicography and Conventional Semantic Meaning
The primary use of corpus linguistics in the investigation of
original public meaning is likely to be in connection with the
identification of the relevant senses or meanings of the words and
phrases that appear in the constitutional text. It seems likely that
many of the words and phrases had meanings at the time of drafting
that correspond to their contemporary meanings (their conventional
semantic meanings in twenty-first century American English). Thus,
it seems extremely unlikely that numerical words, as in two senators,
have undergone significant linguistic drift. In other cases, the
relevant sense of the word may not be available to contemporary
linguistic intuitions because of linguistic drift or semantic shift. For
these cases, the application of corpus techniques may reveal the
relevant meaning.
For example, a corpus lexicography approach to the meaning of
the word science in late eighteenth century American English would
begin by identifying relevant corpora. The best corpus for this
purpose will be COFEA, which is currently under development at
Brigham Young University Law School. 53 When COFEA becomes
available, a collocates search using the phrase science of could be
conducted. Results of the search could then be coded (using blind
coding) as consistent or inconsistent with various candidate
meanings. The outcome of this process would be a set of candidate
meanings—different senses of the word science that might have been
employed in the Intellectual Property Clause of Article I, Section 8.
For illustrative purposes, we can conduct the search in COHA
(which targets a later historical period). The most common
collocates, include the following, ranked one through twenty in
terms of frequency:

52. See Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference, BYU L., http://lawcorpus.byu.edu/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (“BYU Law School is currently developing the Corpus of Founding
Era American English (COFEA).”).
53. Id.
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Table 1: Collocates for science of
Rank

Collocate of science of

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Government
Economy
Many
Life
Language
War
Language
Life
Politics
Art
Law
Chemistry
History
Education
Astronomy
Religion
Society
Psychology
Theology
Physics

142
105
71
65
65
62
61
59
57
54
54
53
43
42
41
40
37
36
34
33

Although this “toy” application of corpus lexicography is very crude,
it illustrates the kind of information that can be revealed by corpus
techniques. There is a modern sense of science that is associated with
the STEM disciplines; a modern reader might assume that science
means the hard sciences and excludes the social sciences, humanities,
and even the other components of STEM (technology, engineering,
and mathematics). But this reading would be incorrect; the frequent
use of science of in proximity with words like government, politics,
art, law, religion, and theology suggests that the word science may
have had a broader meaning, perhaps corresponding to
1646
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“[k]nowledge or understanding acquired by study; acquaintance
with or mastery of any branch of learning”—one of the definitions
offered by the Oxford English Dictionary. 54
C. Collocates and Contextual Disambiguation
Although corpus lexicography can help to identify the
conventional semantic meanings that were available to the authors
and readers of a constitutional provision, corpus data alone cannot
disambiguate the text. Corpus data may tell us something about the
relative frequency of the various meanings, but the most frequent
meaning is not necessarily the ordinary meaning in context. 55 For
example, the most frequent use of the word impeachment may be
“the action of calling into question the integrity or validity of
something” as in “impeachment of a witness,” but in the context of
Article I, Sections 2 and 3 and Article II, Sections 2 and 4,
impeachment is used in the sense that refers to “a charge of
misconduct made against the holder of a public office.”
Contextual disambiguation is usually accomplished by reading
the relevant provision and determining which meaning of an
ambiguous word or phrase gives the provision a coherent meaning.
It would make little sense for the House of Representatives to have
the power to impeach witnesses, but it makes perfect sense for the

54. Science, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172672?
redirectedFrom=science#eid (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (providing, as one definition of science,
“The kind of organized knowledge or intellectual activity of which the various branches of
learning are examples”).
55. Professor Clarissa Hessick writes, “Corpus linguists advocate treating the ‘ordinary
meaning’ inquiry in statutory interpretation as an empirical question: the ordinary meaning
should be ascertained by consulting a linguistics database to determine how frequently a term
is used in a certain manner.” Clarissa Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017
BYU L. REV. 1503, 1504. To the extent that Professor Hessick is making a claim about all (or
almost all) advocates of corpus linguistics, this claim is in error and unsubstantiated. Frequency
data may be evidence of the ordinary meaning of a term in context, but this evidence must be
combined with contextual disambiguation, including the context provided by the text itself
(e.g., the whole statute or whole constitution) and the relevant context of communication
(e.g., the publicly available context of constitutional communication). Another corpus
technique—the identification of collocates—may assist the process of contextual
disambiguation, as is illustrated in Table 1 above. Hessick does not discuss the role that an
analysis of collocates might play in contextual disambiguation, nor does she consider the role
that corpus linguistics should play in a more comprehensive methodology of statutory
interpretation—analogous to the method of incorporation proposed in this Article.
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House to levy a charge of misconduct against “[t]he President, VicePresident, and all civil officers of the United States” 56 and for those
officials to be tried by the Senate and then removed from office if
convicted. Corpus lexicography can identify the set of candidate
meanings and the surrounding and connecting provisions
then disambiguate.
Nonetheless, corpus techniques may also be useful in the process
of contextual disambiguation. Corpus techniques allow searches for
words used in proximity with each other. Thus, the word commerce
in Article I, Section 8 appears near the word regulate. COFEA could
be searched for occurrences of these words or related forms of their
root words in proximity, and such searches might be relevant to the
question whether the word commerce was used in a sense referring to
“trade in goods” or whether it instead was used to mean something
like “social interaction.” 57
D. Corpus Linguistics and Contextual Enrichment
Corpus techniques play an even more attenuated role in the
discovery of contextual enrichments. Contextual enrichments are
context specific, whereas corpus techniques reveal data about the use
of words in phrases outside the particular context of use. This is not
to say that corpus lexicography plays no role in the identification of
contextual enrichments. In order to understand the context that
gives rise to an enrichment, the interpreter must understand
the words and phrases that constitute the context. In this
sense, contextual enrichments are almost always parasitic on
semantic meanings. 58
The existence of modulations provides an important limitation
on the use of corpus lexicography. Modulations can be created on
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
57. Compare Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that
“commerce” means “intercourse”) with Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of
“Commerce”, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623 (criticizing Balkin’s view and arguing that “commerce”
meant the trade or transportation of things or persons).
58. I say “almost always” because it is at least possible that a contextual enrichment
could result from nonverbal cues that do not depend on semantic meaning. This possibility
may be limited to oral communication or the unusual case of face-to-face written
communication (e.g., the use of signs or cue-cards). I am bracketing questions involving
sign language.
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the fly—the meaning of a word can be modified through usage.
Thus, the word recess in the Recess Appointments Clause may have
been a modulation created by the juxtaposition of the recess of the
Senate with the session of the Senate. This modulation may have
come into being when the Recess Appointments Clause was drafted.
This sense of recess would not be revealed by corpus techniques
focused on usage prior to the Constitution, because the modulation
did not preexist the Constitution itself. Post-Constitution usage
might reveal the modulation, but only if the corpora included the
modulated term.
V. THE ORIGINALIST METHOD OF IMMERSION
Corpus linguistics is data-driven. It involves large datasets,
coding, and quantification. The method of immersion is quite
different; it requires the investigators to immerse themselves in the
texts from the relevant period in order to “train up” their linguistic
intuitions. The method of immersion is related to methods utilized
by historians and political scientists, particularly methods associated
with the intellectual history tradition in history departments and the
American political development tradition in political science, but, as
we shall see, it is different in significant respects.
A. What is “Immersion”?
For the purposes of this Article, let us stipulate the following
description of the method of immersion:
The originalist method of immersion in the language of the period
consists in the researcher reading a wide variety of sources from the
relevant period. To count as immersive, the reading must draw on
sources that are representative of language use of the relevant
period. Such sources are not limited to writings directly relevant to
the Constitution, but should include sources such as diaries,
newspapers, broadsheets, novels, and letters. Immersion requires a
substantial period, months and years, not days and weeks.

This description should be viewed as tentative—a proposal for
discussion at a preliminary stage rather than a well-developed and
tested standard for scholarly practice.
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B. Is Immersion Required to Recover Communicative Content?
Native speakers of a natural language possess linguistic
competence. This means that in ordinary cases they will be able
glean the communicative content of well-formed expressions in that
language. Thus, because I am a native speaker of American English
of the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first
century, I am usually able to understand written and spoken English
produced during my lifetime—although I might have difficulty with
some dialects and the specialized vocabulary of some linguistic
subcommunities. The linguistic competence of non-native speakers is
different: I have had some formal training in German, Italian, and
Spanish. Although I am not fluent in any of those languages, I can
understand simple sentences, and I can usually translate German into
English with the aid of a dictionary. Some non-native speakers may
achieve linguistic competence in a second language that is
substantially equivalent to that acquired by native speakers. There
are no native speakers of eighteenth century or nineteenth century
American English today, but it is at least possible that the method of
immersion could produce linguistic competence that approximates
the linguistic competences of eighteenth and nineteenth century
native speakers of American English.
Public meaning originalism requires the reconstruction of
the communicative content of the constitutional text. Such
reconstruction requires interpreters to be able to access the semantics
and pragmatics available to a competent speaker of American English
at the time each provision was framed and ratified.
Consider semantics first! Because twenty-first century American
English is closely related to the American English of the late
eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, and the early twentieth
century, acquiring competence for those periods is not as difficult as
acquiring linguistic competence in a foreign language or in the
English of a much earlier period. Although there are variations in
semantics (due to linguistic drift) the semantics of the relevant
periods are not difficult to acquire. For example, American law
students read eighteenth-century texts, including the Constitution,
The Federalist Papers, and excerpts from the Philadelphia Convention
as well as many early nineteenth-century opinions. Reading such
texts may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Even constitutional
1650
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scholars may fail to notice that a word or phrase had a different
meaning in the relevant period, but such mistakes are likely to be
rare. For example, contemporary readers of the constitution are
unlikely to read domestic violence in Article IV as referring to spousal
abuse, child abuse, or elder abuse; the surrounding context is
sufficient to avoid the error.
Not every case of linguistic drift is easily detectible. Modern
readers may be unaware of the fact that the primary use of dollar in
the eighteenth century referred to a Spanish coin. 59 It is even
possible for a modern reader to make the egregious mistake of
assuming that dollar referred to modern Federal Reserve Notes. But
even in this case, immersion in the primary materials is not required
to detect the linguistic drift. The Oxford English Dictionary provides
the following definition of dollar:
2. The English name for the peso or piece of eight (i.e. eight
reales), formerly current in Spain and the Spanish American
colonies, and largely used in the British N. American Colonies at
the time of their revolt. 60

The definition itself mentions the use of the Spanish dollar during
the relevant historical period, and the first instance of usage for the
definition that refers to U.S. currency dates from 1782. 61 Thus, even
casual research is sufficient to raise the possibility of linguistic drift.
So far as I am aware, no one has produced an example of
linguistic drift that could only be detected by someone who has
immersed themselves in eighteenth century sources—although it is
possible that such examples exist. Because the language of the
constitutional text has been in continuous use and thereby influences
contemporary usage and because there has been substantial
continuity in the evolution of American English, most contemporary
readers who acquire some background knowledge are likely to
believe that they understand the constitutional text. There may be
some exceptions. Some constitutional provisions—perhaps the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Privileges or Immunities
59. Dollar, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/56602?
redirectedFrom=dollar#eid (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Clause—may seem obscure to contemporary readers. I have an
intuitive sense of the meaning of the individual words in these
clauses, but their precise communicative content is difficult to parse.
When confronted with these clauses, my instinct is that extensive
consultation of the constitutional record may be necessary to glean
their original meaning. 62
If it is unlikely that immersion is required to access the semantic
content of most of the constitutional text, what about contextual
disambiguation and enrichment? Immersion might be required to
recreate the context that enables disambiguation of words or phrases
with multiple meaning. Likewise, immersion might enable recreation
of the context necessary for contextual enrichments such as
implicatures, implicitures, and presuppositions. The extent to which
immersion is necessary depends on particular enrichments. Some
enrichments are obvious with general knowledge of the context,
whereas others may be subtle and require the deep knowledge
produced by immersion. Because it requires actual immersion and a
search for original communicative content to recognize enrichments
that require deep knowledge, it may well be the case that we do not
yet know what enrichments would emerge from immersive study of
the text.
C. Distinguishing Immersion from the Methods of Intellectual History
The method of immersion, as I have described it, bears
important affinities to methods employed by historians and
particularly to the methods employed in the subfield of intellectual
history. Intellectual historians immerse themselves in the texts of the
period, actor, or set of ideas that they study. There are, however,
substantial differences between the two approaches. A full account of
the relationship between history and originalism is far beyond the
scope of this Article. Nonetheless, some of the differences can
be sketched:
•

The originalist method of immersion aims to recover the
communicative content of the constitutional text. Historical

62. On the difficulties with interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clauses, see John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014).
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immersion typically has different aims, including the
construction of narratives that illuminate causal connections
and the discovery of the motives and aim of historical actors.
The originalist method of immersion draws on sources that
are relevant given the theory of original meaning. For public
meaning originalism, immersion aims to recreate the
linguistic competence of members of the public who
were members of the intended readership of the
constitutional text. 63
The originalist method of immersion assumes that the
constitutional text provides a coherent plan of government
that should constrain constitutional practice—a claim that
originalists redeem by making arguments for the Constraint
Principle (or a similar idea). Historians may not share this
aim, and may instead believe that the Constitution is
incoherent, unworkable, illegitimate, or evil. 64 Given these
background beliefs, some historians have no interest in
recovering the communicative content of the constitutional
text—an enterprise they may regard as pernicious or foolish.

Given the differences in aim, sources, and assumptions, the
originalist method of immersion and the kinds of immersion
practiced by historians are likely to diverge in practice.
Work by the eminent constitutional historian Jack Rakove reflects
immersion in the framing period, 65 but Rakove’s Original Meanings
does not focus on the communicative content of the text—indeed,
the text is rarely quoted and never (or almost never) parsed for its

63. Other versions of originalism would have different versions of immersion. For
example, original methods originalism would aim to recover the legal competence of
practitioners of the original methods of constitutional interpretation and construction.
Intentionalists would aim to recover the communicative intentions of the authors of particular
constitutional provision. Similar points could be made about other forms of originalism.
64. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Constitution Doesn’t Mean What You Think It Means,
BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2017/04/01/theconstitution-doesn-mean-what-you-think-means/2fvpqWCBD7BP1CPLCBHlZP/story.html.
For some questions about Bilder’s claims, see Lawrence B. Solum, Professor Bilder, Please
Answer These Questions!, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2017), http://lsolum.typepad.
com/legaltheory/2017/04/professor-bilder-please-answer-these-questions.html.
65. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1st Vintage Books Ed. 2010).
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communicative content. Like most intellectual historians, Rakove’s
primary concern is with motivations, ideology, and ideas, and not
with the semantics or pragmatics of the Constitution. Another recent
example of the divergence is provided by Michael Klarman’s The
Framers’ Coup, 66 a history of the framing and ratification of the
Constitution that is almost wholly unconcerned with the original
public meaning of the constitutional text. 67 Klarman’s neo-Beardisan
account of the making of the Constitution is aimed at establishing
the antidemocratic nature of the Constitution and the self-interested
motives of the framers, but Klarman does not aim to recover the
communicative content of any of the specific clauses that make up
the constitutional text. The aim of immersion as practiced by
Rakove, Klarman, and others is not the recovery of original meaning.
This suggests that originalist immersion, despite its similarity to
immersion as practiced by historians, will differ in significant
respects. Many intellectual historians do not aim at the recovery of
the linguistic competences of the public as their primary goal.
This point about the aims of historians should be qualified. Some
historians are very interested in the original meaning of the
constitutional text—even if they are also interested in purposes,
motives, and political context. 68
VI. THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECORD
The method of studying the constitutional record is the most
familiar and widely practiced approach to originalist research. The
first step in the explication of this method is identification of its
component parts.

66. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (2016).
67. The phrase public meaning does not appear in The Framers’ Coup, nor do related
phrases like original meaning (except in citations), communicative content, linguistic meaning,
or semantic meaning (and the word semantic in any usage). Indeed, the word meaning is
almost always used in one of its senses that is not connected to linguistic meaning. The search
was conducted on the Kindle version of The Framer’s Coup.
68. This claim is not susceptible of documentation. My impression is that this group of
historians includes Dean William Treanor at Georgetown University Law Center and G.
Edward White at the University of Virginia School of Law. It seems likely that there are
many others.
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A. Five Components: Precursor Provisions, Drafting History,
Ratification Debates, Early Historical Practice, and Early
Judicial Decisions
There are at least five components of the method of studying the
constitutional record: (1) precursor provisions and proposals, (2) the
drafting history, (3) the ratification debates, (4) the early historical
practice, and (5) early judicial decisions. From the perspective of
public meaning originalism, the point of studying the record of
framing, ratification, and implementation is that it may shed light on
the communicative content of the constitutional text. 69 This list is
not intended to be exclusive, but these five components are among
the most important elements of the constitutional record. Brief
comments on each component provide a sketch of the way the
method operates.
1. Precursor provisions and proposals
The first component is examination of precursor provisions and
proposals. For example, the Articles of Confederation and various
state constitutions provide precursors of the U.S. Constitution.
Similarly, there are various precursors of the first eight amendments
to the Constitution—now called “the Bill of Rights.” The
examination of precursor provisions provides insight into the
language of constitutional provisions. Where the language is similar
or identical, discussion of the meaning of the precursor provision
may provide insight into the language of the constitutional text.
Where the language is different, the differences may illuminate the
meaning—especially if the drafting history focuses on the difference.
2. The drafting history
The second component is the drafting history. In the case of the
unamended text, the drafting history is provided by the records of
the Philadelphia Convention—although the official record is sparse
and recent scholarship claims (with substantial support) that
69. Other forms of originalism will be interested in the record for other reasons. For
example, intentionalists will be especially interested in the legislative history for the light it
sheds on the communicative intentions of the drafters.
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Madison made substantial revisions of his more complete record of
the deliberations at the Convention. 70 The various amendments were
drafted by Congress pursuant to its Article V power to propose
amendments for ratification by the states. 71
From the perspective of public meaning originalism, it is
important to understand the limited role of the drafting history. This
topic was explored by Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen in
their important article, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History. 72 The drafting history, like any other text
from the period, can shed light on the conventional semantic
meanings of the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional
text. In other words, the drafting history can provide evidence of
conventional semantic meaning, but this role is evidential. The
drafting history may be a valuable source because it provides
instances of usage of the words that are likely to reflect the senses in
which the words would have been understood by the public.
Likewise, the drafting history may provide evidence that confirms or
disconfirms the hypothesis that a particular provision gives rise to a
contextual enrichment.
But this role is only evidential. For a variety of reasons, it is at
least possible that the public meaning of the text will diverge from
the meaning supported by the evidence provided by the drafting
history. For example, it is at least possible that obscure language
would acquire a more definite meaning during the drafting process
because of “echo chamber effects.” 73 The provision is explicated and
the explication is accepted and repeated. Through this process,
language that is unclear could come to seem clear to the participants
in the drafting process even though the public would simply not
understand the language or would have an understanding that
diverged from that of the drafters. Another possibility is that the
70. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (2015).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
72. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113 (2003).
73. The notion of an echo-chamber effect is usually invoked in nonlinguistic contexts.
See, e.g., Nicholas DiFonzo, The Echo-Chamber Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011, 3:56 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/22/barack-obama-and-the-psychology
-of-the-birther-myth/the-echo-chamber-effect.
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language was drafted to convey one impression to the public, but a
different meaning was to be conveyed to insiders (for example,
members of the Supreme Court). 74 Secret drafting processes or the
manipulation of the drafting record could create space for this kind
of deception.
3. The ratification debates
The third component is the record of ratification. In the case of
the unamended Constitution, the ratification debates are the records
of the ratifying conventions held in the several states and the public
debates in various sources, including prominently The Federalist
Papers and the writings of various Antifederalists. In the case of the
amendments, ratification occurs in the state legislatures. Depending
on the amendment, such records may or may not be easily available;
in some cases, they may be nonexistent.
Debates over ratification of a constitutional provision have
significant advantages over the drafting history as evidence of public
meaning. Many ratifiers of the unamended Constitution were not
participants in the drafting process; the perspective of these ratifiers
is similar to that of the public. The ratification debates for the
unamended Constitution were conducted in a variety of forums: in
the ratifying conventions, newspapers, pamphlets, and broadsheets.
Both supporters and opponents of the constitution participated in
the debates. Amendments are debated in state legislatures, and their
deliberations are accompanied by public political debate—although
such debate rarely approaches the extensive and intensive
discussions that characterized the Philadelphia Convention and The
Federalist Papers.

74. For a discussion of the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to
create deliberate ambiguity, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51–53 (1988) (discussing ambiguity
introduced by final version of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment and stating “[a]
second explanation [for the ambiguity] is the committee . . . substituted a phrasing that was
sufficiently broad so that those who favored federal protection of political rights could
construe it to provide such protection, and sufficiently innocuous so that those who opposed
giving such power to the federal government could be reassured that the amendment did no
such thing”).
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There are, however, limits on the evidentiary value of the
ratification debates. Adversarial discourse is unlikely to result in
dispassionate and neutral assessment of the communicative content
of the text. Opponents of ratification are likely to interpret the text
in ways that support arguments that adoption would produce
consequences that would be viewed as undesirable. Proponents of
the text will do the opposite. This phenomenon is familiar from
debates about the extent of the legislative power granted by the text
produced by the Philadelphia Convention. Antifederalists argued
that the broad goals outlined in the Preamble and the Necessary and
Proper Clause would produce virtually unlimited federal power 75;
Federalists countered that Article I conferred only those legislative
powers “herein granted,” that the enumeration of powers in Section
8 was limited, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause would not
confer unlimited power. 76 After ratification, a remarkable
transformation took place. High Federalists argued that
federal power was virtually unlimited, and Antifederalists opposed
this reading. 77
4. Early historical practice
The early history of implementation also provides evidence
bearing on the communicative content of the constitutional text. If
those who implemented the text intended to act in ways that are
consistent with the text, what they did is evidence of what they
understood the text to mean. This evidence disfavors hypotheses that
are inconsistent with the early implementation history and favors
those that are consistent. Moreover, the meaning of the text may
have been debated in connection with early historical practice; those
debates may shed light on the meaning of the text.
Once again, there are limitations on the value of this category of
evidence. There is no guarantee that the officials (e.g., presidents
and members of Congress) did in fact make good faith efforts to

75. See Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1059–60.
76. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1507 (2001).
77. For history of the debates after ratification, see JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 71–92 (1999).
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remain in compliance with the Constitution. In some cases, they may
simply have neglected to consider the constitutional questions; in
other cases, they may have deliberately decided to violate the
Constitution. Even if they acted in good faith, they may have
engaged in motivated reasoning, convincing themselves that their
action was consistent with public meaning of the text when in fact it
was not.
One way to sort out the evidentiary value of early historical
practice is to distinguish three categories: (1) disputed practice, (2)
undisputed practice, and (3) inaction.
a. Disputed historical practice. The most prominent example of
the role of early historical practice in constitutional interpretation
and construction is the controversy over the First Bank of the United
States. The constitutionality of the Bank was the subject of a serious
dispute, famously including opinions from various members of
President Washington’s cabinet, including Hamilton, Madison, and
Randolph. 78 The fact of dispute itself is relevant to the assessment of
the meaning of the Sweepings Clause—and one lesson of the dispute
might be that the clause’s public meaning was ambiguous. The
concept of “liquidation” is associated with the Bank dispute and its
subsequent treatment by Madison in connection with his decision to
sign the bill establishing the Second Bank of the United States—
despite his earlier doubts about the constitutionality of the First
Bank. 79 One reading of Madison’s theory of liquidation is that it was
a method of construction for the resolution of ambiguity and
therefore not a method for discovery of the public meaning of
the text.
One difficulty with early but disputed practice is that the
statements of the disputants may not provide accurate
representations of the communicative content of the constitutional

78. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Congressional Power, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7–45
(2016); Michael Coblenz, The Fight Goes on Forever: “Limited Government” and the First Bank
of the United States, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 391, 409–38 (2015).
79. The basic idea of liquidation is that historical practice may resolve a dispute about
the meaning of the text by “liquidating” the ambiguity. For a discussion of “liquidation,” see
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation (Aug. 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author); Paul G. Ream, Note, Liquidation of Constitutional Meaning Through Use, 66
DUKE L.J. 1645 (2017).
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text. They may engage in motivated reasoning or have incentives to
“twist words” to achieve a political objective. Disputes over the
constitutionality of early practice provide evidence of meaning, but
that evidence needs to be carefully assessed.
b. Undisputed historical practice. Another kind of early historical
practice occurs when constitutionally salient action is taken without
discussion or debate of the constitutional issues. Thus, legislation
enacted by the First Congress provides some evidence that the
enacted measures were thought to be within the legislative power of
Congress, and this evidence would count against any theory of the
meaning of Article I that is inconsistent with such evidence.
Undisputed historical practice suffers from a different problem
than does the disputed variety. If the constitutional issues are never
discussed, it is possible that the early practice was unconstitutional
but uncontroversial. Once again, undisputed historical practice
provides evidence relevant to communicative content, but careful
assessment of the evidence is required.
c. Inaction. The final category is not historical practice in the
conventional sense of a constitutionally salient action; rather this
category consists of “dogs that did not bark”—actions that were not
taken during the historical period shortly following the adoption of a
constitutional provision. That Congress failed to enact a particular
piece of legislation is consistent both with the hypothesis that it
lacked power to do so and with the hypothesis that it did have such
power. This evidence, however is highly dependent on context.
Most inaction provides very weak evidence of original meaning
because inaction can result from so many reasons and causes.
Members of Congress may never have considered the possibility of
passing the law in question. Or they may have considered the
possibility and concluded that the legislation was undesirable. Or
they may have considered the legislation, concluded that it was
desirable, but then realized that the proposed legislation was
unconstitutional. If inaction is accompanied by a record of
deliberation about a constitutional issue, that record may provide
evidence of original meaning—although the usual caveats about the
possibility of motivated reasoning apply.
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One example of the use of inaction as evidence of constitutional
meaning is contained in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. 80 Roberts reasoned
that the failure of Congress to use the power to mandate some
action by individuals not currently engaged in interstate commerce
had never been exercised by Congress in the past and that this
provided evidence that Congress lacked such a power. 81
5. Early judicial decisions
Another aspect of the record that may bear on public meaning of
the constitutional text is early judicial decisions interpreting the
Constitution. The case for the evidentiary value of the early decisions
is similar to that of early historical practice by the political branches.
The early judicial decisions are close in time to drafting of the text. If
judges aim in good faith to determine the public meaning of the
text, their understanding would be strong evidence of that meaning.
If an early decision provides a discussion of the linguistic meaning of
the provision,that would be especially valuable evidence of the
original public meaning, but applications would also have evidentiary
value. Interpretations that are consistent with early decisions would
be favored by those decisions, whereas interpretations that are
inconsistent with the early decisions would be disfavored.
As with early historical practice, there may be reasons to discount
early judicial decisions. The assumption that the judges in early cases
are attempting to discern public meaning in good faith may be false.
Early judges may have had political or ideological agendas. For
example, some may believe that John Marshall’s early constitutional
decisions served a pro-nationalist or High Federalist political
agenda—expanding the power of the national government beyond
that authorized by the original public meaning of the constitutional

80. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
81. Id. at 549–51 (“[S]ometimes the most telling indication of a severe constitutional
problem is the lack of historical precedent for Congress’s action.” (internal citations and
punctuation omitted)); see also Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407
(2017) (critiquing the argument that a novel exercise of power is evidence of that
power’s unconstitutionality).
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text. 82 Others may believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in the
Slaughterhouse Cases substantially departed from the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—perhaps because of judicial hostility. 83
Even if early judges acted in subjective good faith, their political
or ideological views might have had a subconscious biasing effect on
their decisions. For example, if language is ambiguous, there may be
a natural tendency to prefer the normatively more attractive
interpretation—and in the early period, judges relied almost
exclusively on their own linguistic intuitions without a significant
external check.
Multimember courts may provide a check on the linguistic
intuitions of individual judges: the biased or mistaken intuitions of
one judge might be counteracted by the more accurate intuitions of
another. But even in this case, it is possible that all judges on the
court share the same bias—for example, during the period following
the election of 1800 when Federalist judges dominated the judiciary
but Democratic-Republicans controlled Congress and the
Presidency. And multi-member courts may be subject to echochamber effects, whereby an initial interpretation comes to dominate
the interpretation of the group through repetition such that an
actual ambiguity becomes invisible to those in the echo chamber.
Another issue is raised by the fact that very few of the earliest
constitutional provisions (through the first ten amendments)
produced judicial decisions. Many of the decisions that are now
recognized as important were rendered many years after the
Philadelphia Convention or the First Congress. For example,

82. FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 132–34
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1981) (noting criticisms of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch); Mark R.
Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some Thoughts on the
Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 916 (2003) (“Many of the most
significant political conflicts during the post-ratification years were precipitated by the Court,
in particular by decisions of John Marshall and his brethren that the Jeffersonian Republicans
abhorred as expressions of a reactionary High Federalist approach to the interrelated questions
of federal power and federal-state relations.”).
83. Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 627, 627 (1994)
(“‘[E]veryone’ agrees the [Supreme] Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.”).
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McCulloch v. Maryland was decided in 1819—some thirty-two years
after the drafting of the Article I. 84 Gibbons v. Ogden was decided in
1824—thirty-seven years after the drafting of the Commerce
Clause. 85 Whatever evidentiary value should be afforded these
cases, they do not represent immediate implementation of
the Constitution.
B. Caveats
The method of studying the record is subject to several caveats,
some of which have been mentioned implicitly in the discussion of
the five components.
1. Distinguishing communicative content and legal content
When engaging in the method of studying the record, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between communicative
content and legal content. 86 During the founding era (as today),
interpretation and construction can become blurred. The
communicative content of the constitutional text may not clearly be
distinguished from the legal content of implementing doctrines. This
issue is particularly important with respect to the record of
implementation by the political branches and early judicial decisions.
Courts articulate legal doctrines, and they may move from discussion
of the linguistic meaning to legal meaning seamlessly, without clearly
identifying the transition from the interpretation of the text to the
construction of implementing rules.
For this reason, it is important to distinguish between the use of
the record of framing, ratification, and implementation as evidence
of communicative content of the constitutional text from the use of
the record as evidence of the legal content of constitutional doctrine
during the period that is proximate in time to the framing and
ratification. Public originalism uses the record as evidence of the
former but rejects the use of the same evidence for the purpose of
84. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
86. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479 (2013) (discussing the distinction between communicative content and
legal content).
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establishing the legal content of early constitutional doctrine that is
supposed to be binding on the present. Original legal content can
provide evidence of public meaning, but legal content does not itself
constitute binding original meaning. 87
2. The proper role of original application expectations
The distinction between communicative content and legal
content is closely related to a caution about the relationship of
original expected applications to original public meaning.
Applications are, by definition, on the construction side of the
interpretation-construction
distinction.
Expectations
about
applications are beliefs about how a provision will be applied to a
particular case or issue. Original expected applications are the
expectations about applications that were held at the time a
constitutional provision was framed and ratified. Expectations are
mental states and, for that reason, different actors can have different
expectations regarding the application of the same constitutional
provision. Thus, there could be applications by the individual
drafters, by the convention or Congress that proposed a
constitutional provision, by the members of the ratifying convention
or state legislature, or by the public.
Crucially, application expectations, even by the author of a text,
are fundamentally different from the communicative content of the
text. The correct application of a text to a legal issue or particular
case involves the application of law to fact. Suppose that an
expectation about application is based on a true belief about the
public meaning of the constitutional text. An application expectation
could nonetheless be a misleading guide to recovering the
communicative content of the text if that expectation was based
on a false belief about the facts. Consider the following
hypothetical example: 88

87. Note that original law originalism may regard the original legal content as binding
today—unless it has been validly changed.
88. The hypothetical examples draw on text in Mary Frances Rooney’s work on this
issue. See M. Frances Rooney, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and an Originalist Defense of Gender Nondiscrimination, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 737 (2017).

1664

10.SOLUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1621

4/26/2018 4:12 PM

Triangulating Public Meaning

Suppose that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a set of basic rights (privileges and
immunities) that include the right to pursue a lawful occupation.
These rights are extended to all citizens of the United States.
Suppose further that these rights are subject to reasonable
regulation for the public good, and hence that a state legislature
can enact a law that limits certain lawful occupations to persons
who are capable of competently engaging in the occupation. The
practice of law is a lawful occupation, but nonetheless, a state
legislature can require that lawyers pass a test (a bar exam) as a
condition for practicing law. And the legislature might also pass a
law that limits the practice of law on the basis of age—disqualifying
children from practicing law on a categorical basis because it is in
fact the case that almost all children lack the intellectual capacity to
practice law. Further suppose that the constitutional record reveals
such an application expectation belief: hypothetically, in debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment, someone might have said that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not be violated by a
statute that required lawyers to pass a bar exam and be of eighteen
or more years of age.

This application belief is consistent with the postulated
interpretation—that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
a set of basic rights among which was the right to pursue a
lawful application.
Now consider a second hypothetical example:
Suppose the understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
postulated above. Assume in addition that at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, almost everyone had a false
belief that women have intellectual capacities that are similar to
those of children and, hence, that women are incapable of
practicing law. Once again, the question arises whether the
application of the amendment to a statute—this time, one that
restricts the practice of law to adult men who have passed the bar
exam. And once again, the record reveals an application belief that
this statue would not be invalidated.

In this second example, one might fallaciously argue that the
application belief is evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
does not protect the rights of women at all because the term citizen
was limited to men. The fallacy in this argument is apparent: the
application belief (restricting the practice of law to men is consistent
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with the Privileges or Immunities Clause) is explained by a false
belief about the facts that is perfectly consistent with a belief that
women are citizens and hence that they do have a right to pursue a
lawful occupation and therefore to practice law—if they have the
intellectual capacity to do so.
These hypotheticals shed light on the relevance of Bradwell v.
Illinois 89 to the interpretation of the Privilege or Immunities Clause.
The Court rejected Myra Bradwell’s argument that her exclusion
from the practice of law by the State of Illinois violated the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. The majority opinion in Bradwell was based
on the Court’s prior decisions in the Slaughterhouse Cases and
United States v. Cruickshank 90—cases in which the majority restricted
the meaning of “Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United
States” to an extremely small set so as to virtually nullify the clause.
Another group of Justices accepted the basic rights interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and did not question that
women were citizens. These Justices rejected Bradwell’s claim on the
basis of a false factual belief—that women lacked the intellectual
capacity necessary for the practice of law. This kind of factual belief is
not part of the communicative content of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Hence, the application beliefs revealed by the
opinions in Bradwell may not provide evidence that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not encompass the basic economic rights of
women, once the process of application is guided by true beliefs
about the intellectual capacities of women. Thus, the original public
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause might be consistent
with conclusion the coverture laws are unconstitutional, given true
beliefs about the capacity of women to manage their own affairs,
while similar restrictions of the property and contractual rights of
young children would nonetheless be constitutional because on the
actual facts, these restrictions are reasonable.

89.
90.
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VII. THE METHOD OF TRIANGULATION
Having discussed the three vertexes of the triangle (corpus
linguistics, immersion, and the record), we can now discuss the
Method of Triangulation itself. How can these three methods
be combined?
Corpus Linguistics

Immersion

The Constitutional
Record

A. Immersion versus Corpus Linguistics
The method of corpus linguistics aims to recover the original
public meaning of the constitutional text by systematic analysis of
corpora—typically large databases that are designed to capture
representative patterns of usage and can be coded to reveal the range
and frequency of conventional semantic meanings. The method of
immersion (as practiced by originalists) aims to recreate the linguistic
capacities of a competent speaker of American English at the time
the constitutional provision at issue was framed and ratified. How
can these methods cross-check each other?
Consider first the role of corpus linguistics in checking the
linguistic intuitions generated by the method of immersion. Were
immersion perfect, it would result in a group of scholars each of
whom had a set of linguistic intuitions that would closely
approximate the linguistic intuitions of native speakers of the
American English of the era.
Of course, different native speakers will have different sets of
linguistic intuitions, reflecting different histories of exposure to the
language. These sets will vary in a number of dimensions. Different
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speakers are exposed to different ranges of usage. Some speakers
acquire larger vocabularies than others—acquiring familiarity with a
greater number of words and phrases. Some speakers become
acquainted with a wider range of meanings and hence have an ability
to disambiguate more accurately, whereas others may have been
exposed to a narrower range of senses of the same words and
phrases. Some speakers acquire knowledge of specialized vocabulary
of linguistic subcommunities, for example, the technical terms used
by lawyers, mariners, or bookkeepers. Other speakers may not be
members of a linguistic subcommunity with a specialized vocabulary.
For this reason, a comprehensive recreation of the linguistic world of
any particular period, for example, the late eighteenth century,
would require multiple immersions—each of which would duplicate
representative speakers of the period. In practice, this ideal may
never be fully realized.
Can the kind of immersion that could be feasibly practiced by
modern scholars replicate the linguistic capacities of competent
speakers from early constitutional periods? Native speakers acquire
language in a particular way: as children, they interact with other
native speakers. This process of interaction includes explicit language
teaching, corrections of errors in usage, observations of success and
failure when the speaker aims to achieve some aim, listening to
conversations, and reading texts of many different kinds. The
interactive component of language acquisition is difficult or
impossible to replicate. For example, historians who practice the
method of immersion typically immerse themselves in texts relevant
to their research project, but they cannot interact with native
speakers of eighteenth-century or mid-nineteenth-century English.
Unless, of course, they have access to a time machine.
Another problem with the replication of linguistic competence
by the method of immersion concerns the representativeness of the
texts that are selected. Historians and legal scholars who immerse
themselves in the texts of a particular period may face selection bias
problems. For example, a constitutional historian might focus on
texts that are relevant to the historian’s research project. This might
include many different sources, letters, diaries, broadsheets, works of
political philosophy, legal texts, and so forth. But such a historian
might not sample nursery rhymes, childrearing manuals, novels, or
the diaries of farmers who did not engage in constitutional debates.
1668
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In other words, text selection may not be adequate to recreate the
linguistic competences of a wide range of ordinary speakers.
The method of corpus linguistics may provide a useful cross
check on these limitations on immersion. First and foremost, welldesigned corpora can address the data limitations inherent in the
method of immersion. Corpora can be very large—much larger than
the body of literature that could be assimilated by any single
immersion scholar. Corpora can be designed to provide
representative samples of the written linguistic world of a particular
period. And corpora can also be designed to include texts that
represent a particular linguistic subculture.
Second, corpus linguistics allows for rigorous intersubjective
validation of individual subjective judgments about word meaning.
One of the dangers of the method of immersion is that immersed
scholars may essentially say, “Trust me. I immersed myself in the
texts of the period. I know what this provision of the Constitution
means.” But how do we know whether the supposedly immersed
scholar is actually immersed? And even if some scholar was deeply
immersed, did biases and prejudices (conscious or unconscious)
distort the scholars understanding of the meaning of the provisions?
Corpus linguistics evidence provides a basis for checking the
interpretations offered by immersed scholars. If corpus research
reveals that the meaning proposed by an immersed scholar was very
rare or nonexistent in the corpus (or corpora) that are queried, that
fact would undermine the proposed interpretation.
Just as corpus linguistics can provide a check on immersion, the
reverse is the case. Immersion can provide a useful check on the
results reached via corpus linguistics. Corpus research can reveal the
range of meanings of a given word or phrase and the relative
frequencies with which these meanings appear within a given corpus.
And via the use of collocates, corpus research can provide some
information relevant to disambiguation. But immersed scholars may
be in a better position than non-immersed scholars when it comes to
disambiguation—especially if the ambiguity in question is subtle,
difficult, or complex. Simple lexical ambiguities may be resolved by
contextual features that can be recognized by non-immersed
scholars. But there may be syntactic ambiguities that are more
difficult to detect. Some forms of ambiguity, such as the ambiguity
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between de dicto and de re usages, may be especially difficult to
recognize, and immersion in the context may help in these cases. 91
Corpus techniques are particularly ill-suited to cases in which the
constitution employs a modulation—creating a new meaning for a
word that deviates in some significant way from preexisting
meanings. The Recess Appointments Clause, discussed above,
provides an example of the possible existence of a constitutional
modulation. The clause reads as follows: “The president shall have
power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of
the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session.” 92
One understanding of this clause is that the phrase “recess of the
Senate” is a modulation, to be understood in juxtaposition with the
“session” of the Senate, and hence limited to what are now called
“intersession recesses.” A corpus-based inquiry into the use of the
word “recess” before the adoption could not have revealed this
meaning—which, assuming that the modulation theory is correct,
came into being with the drafting of the constitutional text.
Moreover, corpus techniques will be most useful in the
investigation of constitutional semantics and syntax, including
contextual disambiguation, but corpus evidence will rarely bear
directly on contextual enrichments such as implicatures, implicitures,
and presuppositions. Because contextual enrichments depend on
shared context, immersion in publicly available context of
constitutional communication may assist the reliable discovery of
contextual enrichments and hence supplement the semantic
information yielded by corpus linguistics.
In sum, the method of corpus linguistics and the method of
immersion are complementary. Both techniques aim to give
contemporary readers access to the communicative content of the
constitutional text, but they do so in different ways. Corpus
linguistics is especially relevant to the discovery of conventional
semantic meanings and can aid disambiguation. Immersion provides

91. United States v. Whittemore, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011, 1011 n.7 (D. Nev.
2013), aff’d, 776 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2015); Jill Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008).
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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an alternative and less systematic route to semantics and is especially
suited to the recovery of contextual enrichments.
B. Corpus Linguistics Versus the Constitutional Record
The relationship between corpus linguistics and the method of
studying the constitutional record is similar to the relationship
between corpus linguistics and immersion. Indeed, the method of
studying the constitutional record is itself a specialized and limited
form of immersion, utilizing a selected set of historical materials that
are directly relevant to the constitutional question at issue.
The most direct and obvious way in which corpus linguistics can
assist in the study of the constitutional record is that the record itself
must be deciphered. Just as older provisions of the constitutional
text (especially through the Twelfth Amendment) are written in the
American English of more than 200 years ago, so too, the
constitutional record of those provisions is itself written in that
language. The conventional sources, including Madison’s notes of
the Philadelphia Convention, The Federalist Papers, Anti-Federalist
writings, the ratification debates, and the records of the First
Congress, all contain words and phrases that may have had different
senses than the contemporary sense of the language.
The method of the constitutional record can be especially helpful
in providing evidence concerning beliefs of constitutional actors
(framers, ratifiers, debaters, members of Congress, judges) that are
related to but not identical with their beliefs about the meanings of
the words and phrases (their semantic beliefs). Of course, the
constitutional record may sometimes reveal direct evidence of
semantic beliefs, when, for example, a constitutional actor defines or
paraphrases a constitutional word or phrase. More frequently, the
constitutional record will provide evidence of beliefs that provide
indirect evidence of semantic beliefs, such as beliefs expressing
expectations concerning the application of the constitutional text to
specific issues or actual and hypothetical situations. Because
application beliefs underdetermine communicative content and
because they can actually be inconsistent with communicative
content, the method of corpus linguistics provides an important
corrective to the method of the constitutional record.
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Similarly, the method of the constitutional record can
supplement and check the results obtained from corpus linguistics.
Most obviously, the method of corpus linguistics may not be
sufficient to resolve semantic ambiguities; contextual disambiguation
requires knowledge of the public context and the constitutional
record provides the most directly relevant elements of that context.
Likewise, corpus linguistics may not yield information sufficient to
identify modulations, but the constitutional record could be a
fruitful source of information that confirms or disconfirms the
hypothesis that a particular word or phrase constitutes a modulation.
C. The Constitutional Record and Immersion
Finally, consider the relationship between the method of
immersion and the method of studying the constitutional record.
Much of the ground has already between covered, but some aspects
of this relationship require separate comment. This relationship
implicates the debate over what is sometimes called “law office
history” and the “history-common-room law.” 93 Some brief
discussion of that debate is necessary to elucidate the two methods
and the ways in which they can each supplement and check
the other.
The charge that lawyers practice “law office history” is a
common one, although the history of this rhetorically charged
phrase is quite different from what one might imagine. The phrase
was first applied to work done by historians in connection with
Brown v. Board of Education 94—and the charge was that the
historians had engaged in advocacy-driven history in order to
support a result that conformed to their political and ideological

93. Nicholas J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the
Incoherence of Justice Steven’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012); Gary
Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits
of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (2012); Saikrishna Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law
Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT 529, 538 (1998). The phrase “history-commonroom law” appears in Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1163 (2015).
94. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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preferences. Subsequently, the criticism has been extended to the use
of history by lawyers, judges, and legal scholars. 95
A full telling of the law-office history debate is outside the scope
of this Article, but two of the criticisms of law-office history are
particularly relevant to the Method of Triangulation. The first
criticism is that judges, lawyers, and legal scholars “cherry pick” the
historical materials, taking individual sentences and paragraphs out of
context and ignoring contrary evidence. The second criticism is that
studying the historical record in isolation is insufficient for deep
understanding because the meaning of the constitutional record
itself can be understood only by scholars who have immersed
themselves in the “thought world” or intellectual and political
context in which the constitutional record is situated.
Although the charge that historians practice “history common
room law” is made less frequently than the “law office history”
charge, it bears significant resemblance to its counterpart. Here, we
need to distinguish between two kinds of historians. Many legal and
constitutional historians are trained in both law and history,
possessing both a Juris Doctor and a Doctor of Philosophy in history or
political science. Other historians lack legal training. When historians
without legal training engage in scholarship about constitutional
history, several difficulties may arise. First, historians who lack a
grounding in contemporary constitutional theory and doctrine may
be criticized on the ground that they do not comprehend the legal
significance of the historical materials they study. Second, the lack of
legal training could result in a lack of capacity to understanding the
contemporary legal implications of even those aspects of history that
they do, in fact, understand correctly. Some historians may also lack a
grounding in the philosophy of language and the discipline of
historical linguistics. Although these deficiencies may not be

95. The literature on “law office history” includes Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119 (locus classicus); Howard Jay Graham, The
Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1953); David T. Hardy,
Lawyers, Historians, and “Law-Office History,” 46 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2015); Rebecca
Piller, History in the Making: Why Courts Are Ill-Equipped to Employ Originalism, 34 REV.
LITIG. 187 (2015); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993);
Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of History, 13
J.L. & POL. 809 (1997).
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significant given the projects that historians typically pursue, they
may create problems in the context of the originalist project of
recovering the communicative content of the constitutional text.
One might equate “law office history” with the method of
studying the constitutional record and “history-common-room law”
with the originalist method of immersion, but these simplifications
are not correct on either score.
The originalist method of immersion, properly understood, has a
specific structure. This structure flows from the target at which the
method is aimed—recovery of the original public meaning of the
constitutional text. Originalist immersion aims to recover the
communicative competence of a competent speaker of American
English at the time a given constitutional provision was framed and
ratified, and relatedly to recover the competences of the members of
the linguistic subcommunities that employed the technical language
and terms of art that appear in the constitutional text (e.g., “Letters
of Marque and Reprisal”). It is possible that some historians have
this aim, but typically that is not the case. Immersion by historians
can aim at any number of goals—uncovering the political and
ideological motives of historical actors, recreating the life world of
particular groups (e.g., working-class women, slaves, or recent
immigrants), and so forth. These aims are radically different.
Immersion in the life world of recent German immigrants in the late
eighteenth century is obviously a poor way to recover the
communicative competence of speakers of American English during
that same period. The originalist practice of immersion is not
identical with “history common room law.”
Likewise, the method of studying the constitutional record of
framing, ratification, and implementation is not identical to “law
office history.” A preliminary distinction is important. The method
of studying the constitutional record can be practiced by different
kinds of actors, including judges, law clerks, lawyers, legal scholars,
and scholars in other disciplines, including history and political
science. These different categories of actors are importantly different
in many respects.
Law clerks (so-called “elbow clerks”) typically serve for one or
two years. Their examination of the historical record would be likely
to focus on those aspects of the record that are directly relevant to
the case to which they assigned, perhaps in connection with writing a
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bench memorandum or drafting an opinion. Typically, bench memos
must be written in a fairly short period of time—perhaps a few days
but a few weeks at most. The drafting of an opinion may extend for
several weeks or a few months, but it is rare for the writing of an
opinion to approach (and much less exceed) a single calendar year.
These time constraints have implications for the breadth and depth
of research that law clerks can conduct. Likewise, lawyers are subject
to time constraints, but they are also obligated to advocate for their
client—and this role may encourage “cherry picking,” especially
given the very strict limits on the length of briefs allowed by the
rules of court. Judges and law clerks are obligated to fairly consider
the arguments of both sides, but once a decision has been made,
there may be a tendency to emphasize the evidence that supports the
decision and to ignore or discount evidence on the other side;
dissenting or concurring opinions, if they are written, may prompt
consideration of contrary evidence, but there is no guarantee that
this will occur.
Legal scholars are in a different position. A research project, even
if limited in scope to a particular issue concerning a particular clause,
may involve many years of research—decades in some cases. In
practice, there is no bright line between the method of immersion
and the method of studying the constitutional record. The most
extensive research undertaken by legal scholars who practice the
method of studying the constitutional record will approximate the
research undertaken by scholars who practice the method of
immersion. Research of this kind involves an internal process of
supplementation and checking—immersion in texts surrounding the
constitutional record are part of the process of studying the
record itself.
When the two methods diverge, the supplementation and
checking function may be performed by comparing and contrasting
the results reached by practitioners of each method. Studying the
constitutional record without immersion might result in a
misunderstanding of the record itself for the reasons that have
already been discussed. Similarly, the method of immersion could be
practiced in a way that does not pay sufficient attention to the
constitutional record—failing to recognize the importance of
evidence drawn from the constitutional record of framing,
ratification, and implementation.
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D. Consilience as the Aim of the Method of Triangulation
There can be no a priori guarantees that the Method of
Triangulation will produce agreement. It is at least possible that the
results of corpus linguistics will be inconsistent with those produced
by immersion and that immersion will call into question the results
derived from study of the constitutional record. Nonetheless, the
corollary of this observation is equally important: we cannot rule out
in advance the possibility of consilience. Triangulation of corpus
linguistics, immersion, and the constitutional record may produce a
set of mutually supportive findings. Where consilience emerges from
the application of all three methods and is reinforced by replication
of each of the individual methods by independent researches, we
would have very good reason to be confident in our conclusions
regarding the original meaning of the constitutional text.
“Replicated consilience” should be the gold standard of originalist research.
A lessor degree of confidence would attach to other scenarios.
For example, where two of the methods agree, but a third is
inconclusive, we might ultimately reach the conclusion that the
results of the two methods provide the best available evidence of
original meaning—even though that evidence does not have the
same high degree of confidence as does consilience. More disturbing
would be scenarios where the results of one of the three methods
contradicts the results derived from the other methods. In some
cases, such disagreement may be explained. For example, if
immersion and the constitutional record suggests that a particular
word should be understood as a modulation of the conventional
semantic meaning, 96 then corpus evidence that supports the
conventional meaning would be explained in a way that would
dissolve the seeming contradiction. We can use the phrase
“partial consilience” to designate scenarios in which there is
partial agreement between methods and residual disagreement
is explainable.

96. As explained supra Sections IV.D, VII.A, the word “recess” in the Recess
Appointments Clause might be a modulation of the conventional semantic meaning of recess.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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Finally, there may be cases in which conflicts between the
methods might not be explainable. Where even partial consilience is
absent, there may be substantial uncertainty about the original
meaning of the constitutional text. In such cases, the allocation of
the burden of persuasion might be essential for the practical
resolution of a constitutional controversy. 97 For example, we might
evaluate the conflicting evidence and conclude that one
interpretation of the text is supported by the “weight of the
evidence”—lawyers use phrases like “preponderance of the evidence”
or “clear and convincing evidence” to describe the burdens of
persuasion that operate in resolving evidentiary conflicts.
VIII. FROM TRIANGULATION TO TRANSLATION
The Method of Triangulation uses corpus linguistics, immersion,
and the constitutional record to discover the original public meaning
of the constitutional text. This means that the primary focus of
originalist methodology is the text itself. One way to think about this
activity is via an analogy with translation. The ultimate aim of
originalist methodology is to translate the constitutional provisions
written in the American English of the period in which each
provision was written into contemporary American English. In many
cases, the analogy of translation is misleading—because
contemporary American English overlaps substantially, even with the
American English of the late eighteenth century. When it comes to
the provision that was drafted most recently, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, it seems likely that there is virtually no divergence with
respect to semantics and if there are substantively significant
contextual enrichments, they are not apparent to me. 98

97. See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2017).
98.
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Without doing careful analysis, it appears to this author that all of the words and
phrases in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment are comprehensible to a modern audience.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §§ 1–2.
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We might represent the movement from triangulation to
translation via the following diagram:

Immersion
Corpus
Linguistics

Constitutional
Record

Translation
of the
Constiutional
Text

We read the text having considered the results yielded by the
methods of corpus linguistics, immersion, and study of the
constitutional record. Taking all three approaches into account, we
then translate the provision at issue from the language of the relevant
period into contemporary language. That translation is the “original
meaning of the constitutional text” as expressed in contemporary
American English. The translation represents the propositions
expressed by the original text in the meaning of the original period
in a modern text (a gloss). The translation is accurate if and only if
the propositions expressed in the constitutional text are identical to
the propositions expressed in the gloss.
The word proposition is being used in a technical sense.
Propositions are to sentences as concepts are to words. Just as the
same word law expresses a concept that can be represented by
different words in other languages (recht in German, loi in French),
so can the propositional content of the constitutional text can
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be represented in contemporary American English or another
natural language. 99
A further step is required to translate the communicative content
of the text into the legal content of constitutional doctrine.
Determining communicative content is “interpretation,” whereas the
specification of legal content is “construction.” The Constraint
Principle requires judges (or other constitutional actors) to craft
doctrines that are consistent with the original public meaning. If the
communicative content of the constitutional text fully determines
the legal content of constitutional doctrine, the process of
constitutional construction may be simple and direct. But if the
communicative content underdetermines legal content, then the
relevant constitutional actors may be required to craft implementing
rules—as specified by a theory of constitutional construction. 100
IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD OF TRIANGULATION
Implementation of the Method of Triangulation is itself a large
topic. Here I will express a few tentative thoughts about the steps
that would need to be taken in order to put the Method of
Triangulation into effect.
A. Triangulation and the Division of Intellectual Labor
For readers who are already familiar with the methods of
originalist research, it will be apparent that full implementation of
the Method of Triangulation is a large task. No one individual could
complete the task of applying all three methods to the full text of the
U.S. Constitution in a single lifetime; indeed, for many of the
Constitution’s articles and clauses, it seems likely that it is not
feasible for a single individual to do all the work necessary to apply

99. See Matthew McGrath, Propositions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ (last updated June 20, 2012); Eric Margolis & Stephen
Laurence, Concepts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/concepts/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
100. See generally Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 12 (discussing
originalist approaches to constitutional construction). For a recent example of an originalist
theory of constitutional construction, see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter
and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism (Oct. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(available online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056).
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the Method of Triangulation. The likelihood that this is true
strongly suggests that implementation of the Method of
Triangulation will require a division of intellectual labor.
We might speculate that some scholars will specialize in each of
the three methods—with some scholars doing corpus linguistics
work, while others practice the methods of immersion and studying
the constitutional record. It is also imaginable that some scholars
would master more than one of the methods, for example,
employing both corpus linguistics and study of the constitutional
record, while achieving some degree of immersion as well.
Scholarship that employs the Method of Triangulation might be coauthored, with an empiricist executing the corpus linguistics portion
of the article and others deploying the methods of immersion and
study of the constitutional record.
B. Triangulation and Interdisciplinary and
Multidisciplinary Scholarship
Another dimension of the Method of Triangulation is that it
requires some degree of interdisciplinary collaboration combined
with multidisciplinary training for legal scholars. For example, legal
scholars could collaborate with linguistics scholars in the design of
corpora and corpus linguistic methods for the investigation of legal
texts. Legal scholars might collaborate with historians and political
scientists trained in the American political development tradition in
designing research programs for implementation of the method of
immersion. Similarly, we might imagine a multidisciplinary training
program for originalist scholars that involves the study of linguistics,
philosophy of language, corpus linguistics, constitutional history,
and historiography.
C. Triangulation in the Courts
Finally, there is the question as to how the Method of
Triangulation can be employed in the courts. Certainly, judges and
their law clerks can employ the method of studying the historical
record directly: this method is familiar to sophisticated lawyers and
judges. The pioneering efforts of Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah
Supreme Court and Justice Joan Larsen of the Michigan Supreme
Court demonstrate that judges and law clerks can learn to employ
1680
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the method of corpus linguistics. It is obvious, however, that the
method of immersion will be inconsistent with the career path and
duties of most judges, lawyers, and law clerks.
For this reason, it seems likely that implementation of the
Method of Triangulation will involve the production of originalist
scholarship in the academy with consumption of that scholarship by
the courts. For this to work well, lawyers, judges, and judicial clerks
will need to be familiar with the Method of Triangulation and its
constituent elements. It is even imaginable that courts of last resort,
including the U.S. Supreme Court and the highest courts of the
several states would employ professionals trained in corpus linguistics
or immersed in particular historical periods to produce sophisticated
in-house evaluations of the originalist claims made in briefs and in
legal scholarship.
CONCLUSION
Originalism as a constitutional theory has evolved substantially
since the word originalism was coined by Paul Brest in 1980. 101 The
emphasis on the original intentions of the framers has given way to
forms of originalism focused on public meaning, original methods,
and original law. Applied originalism has flourished, with so many
articles and monographs that compiling a catalog would be a
daunting task. But despite the flourishing of originalist theory and
practice, method has lagged behind. The aim of this Article is to
initiate a conversation about originalist methodology and to make
tentative suggestions about an approach that promises objective and
transparent methods that aim at convergent answers to questions
about the original meaning of the constitutional text. The Method
of Triangulation aims at consilience—agreement between the
methods of corpus linguistics, immersion, and study of the
constitutional record.
Where consilience between the methods of corpus linguistics,
immersion, and study of the constitutional record is achieved and
replicated, we can be reasonably confident that we have recovered

101. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 234 (1980).
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the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The recovery
of original public meaning may be difficult, and in some cases
impossible, but the Method of Triangulation combined with
replication provides the ideal to which originalists can aspire.
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